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What determines euro area bank CDS 
spreads ?
Introduction
In recent years, market participants and regulators alike 
have begun to look to bank credit default swap (CDS) 
spreads  as  indicators  of  bank  credit  risk.  Indeed,  since 
the financial crisis began in mid-2007, bank CDS spreads 
have increased considerably, and by as much as several 
hundred basis points for some banks. Recent regulatory 
initiatives have also used CDS spreads for pricing govern-
ment guarantees for bank debt and for recapitalization 
instruments (ECB, 2008a and 2008b). However, little is 
known about the determinants of bank CDS spreads and, 
in particular, the degree to which credit risk or some other 
factors might account for these increases.
Recent  studies  focusing  on  non-financial  firms  indeed 
suggest that, in addition to credit risk, CDS spreads reflect 
other  factors  such  as  liquidity  (see  e.g.  Tang  and  Yan, 
2008). Yet, because banks are considerably more opaque 
than non-financial firms and banks’ business models are 
different, it is an open question whether the results for 
non-financial firms also apply to banks.
This article presents an empirical analysis of the determi-
nants of CDS spread changes for 31 listed euro area banks 
over the period from 1 January 2004 to 22 October 2008. 
Interestingly, to date hardly any attempt has been made to 
assess the determinants of CDS spreads for financial insti-
tutions.  (1) In choosing the determinants of changes in CDS 
premia, we use variables suggested by structural credit 
risk models as well as a variable reflecting CDS market 
liquidity.  We  also  find  that  adding  variables  reflecting 
general economic conditions (which could potentially cap-
ture factors such as systematic credit risk or risk aversion) 
improves the explanatory power of our model.
The analysis reveals three main results. First, the determi-
nants of changes in bank CDS spreads exhibit significant 
time variation. Second, variables suggested by structural 
credit risk models are not significant in explaining bank 
CDS  spread  changes,  either  in  the  period  prior  to  the 
crisis or in the crisis period itself. However, some of the 
variables  proxying  for  general  economic  conditions  are 
significant, but the magnitude of the coefficient estimates 
and their sign have changed over time. Third, CDS market 
liquidity  became  a  significant  factor  in  explaining  bank 
CDS  spread  changes  when  the  crisis  broke  out  in  the 
summer of 2007. 
The  remainder  of  this  article  is  organised  as  follows. 
Section 1 gives some background information on credit 
default  swaps.  In  Section  2,  we  discuss  the  potential 
determinants of CDS spreads, which include credit risk, 
CDS market liquidity and general economic conditions. 
Section 3 presents our data and model. Section 4 reports 
the  results  of  our  empirical  analysis.  The  last  section 
concludes.
Jan annaert 
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(1)    Notable exceptions are Düllmann and Sosinska (2007), who analyse the CDS 
spreads for 3 German banks and Raunig and Scheicher (2009), who contrast 
bank CDS spreads to those in other industries.154
1.    Credit default swaps : background 
information
Credit  default  swaps  are  credit  derivatives  traded  on 
over-the-counter  (OTC)  markets,  and  which  function 
like  a  traded  insurance  contract  in  which  a  protection 
buyer accepts to pay a periodic fee (called “spread” or 
“premium”) in exchange for a payment by the protection 
seller  in  the  case  of  a  credit  event  (bankruptcy,  failure 
to pay, etc.) on a reference entity. Credit default swap 
spreads should be therefore closely linked to the credit 
quality  of  the  reference  entity  and  should  represent  a 
measure of its credit risk. In recent years, CDS spreads 
have acquired a prominent role as market-based credit 
indicators thanks to stellar growth of the CDS market. 
For instance, the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) 
estimates the outstanding amounts on CDS to have risen 
from about 6 trillion USD in December 2004 to 57 trillion 
USD in June 2008.
The remainder of this section describes the recent evolu-
tion of euro area bank CDS spreads before comparing 
CDS spreads with other indicators of credit risk.
1.1    Recent evolution of euro area bank CDS 
spreads
Chart  1  and  the  subsequent  discussion  illustrate  the 
evolution of CDS spreads of a sample of large euro area 
banks  between  1  January  2007  and  31  March  2009 
(Section 3 details the sample design and composition).
Chart 1 shows that, prior to the summer of 2007, CDS 
spreads of large euro area banks were relatively low and 
exhibited low variation. Indeed, the median CDS spread 
was about 10 basis points (bps), a level similar to what 
had been observed since early 2004.
Following the announcement by Bear Stearns on 16 July 
2007 that two of its subprime hedge funds had lost nearly 
all of their value, euro area bank CDS spreads started to 
widen significantly. Over the next few months, spreads 
further  increased  due  to  investors’  concerns  about  the 
exposure of banks to subprime mortgages, before some-
how  stabilising  in  mid-December  following  monetary 
actions by central banks around the world and the intro-
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CHART 1  CDS SPREADS OF LARGE EURO AREA BANKS, 1 JANUARY 2007 – 31 MARCH 2009
  (in basis points)
Source : Datastream, ECB and NBB.
Note : see Section 3 for details about the sample design and composition.155
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This  stabilisation  proved  to  be  relatively  short-lived  as 
euro area bank CDS spreads started to rise again in early 
2008 up to the bail-out of Bear Stearns by the Fed on 
14 March. Following the subsequent announcement by 
the  US  Treasury  of  a  major  package  to  reform  regula-
tion of US financial markets and prevent future financial 
crises, CDS spreads of euro area banks started to decline 
significantly in late March. In May, however, this very rapid 
decline came to a halt perhaps as a result of the nega-
tive turn of the global corporate sector credit cycle and 
weakening housing markets in some euro area countries.
After  a  moderate  increase  throughout  the  summer 
of  2008,  euro  area  financial  institutions’  CDS  spreads 
surged in late September, following the failure of Lehman 
Brothers, the effects of which rapidly spread throughout 
the financial system contributing to a sudden evaporation 
of liquidity in many markets. In Europe, the initial market 
responses to the various national measures announced in 
early October was positive, as suggested by the marked 
decrease in bank CDS spreads. However, spreads contin-
ued to remain at historically high levels after these inter-
ventions, and even through March 2009, suggesting that 
market participants continued to perceive a high level of 
systemic risk.
1.2    Comparison of CDS spreads with other 
indicators of credit risk
CDS spreads are only one of the several indicators avail-
able to the market to assess credit risk. Two other well-
known measures for credit risk are bond yield spreads and 
credit ratings.
Bond yield spreads represent the difference between the 
yield on a risky asset and an equivalent risk-free asset, 
often proxied by the yield on a government bond or a 
swap contract. Compared to bond spreads, CDS spreads 
have  two  main  advantages.  First,  they  do  not  have  to 
be  computed  vis-à-vis  a  risk-free  benchmark,  as  they 
are directly observable. Second, CDS spreads have been 
found to react more quickly to information regarding the 
changes in the credit quality of the underlying name com-
pared to the bond market (Hull et al., 2004).
Credit ratings represent a rating agency’s opinion of the 
creditworthiness of an issuer and the likelihood that an 
obligation will be repaid on time, in full, with interest. 
Credit ratings are primarily based on public information 
supplemented with private information obtained by the 
rating agency from the issuer.
One  important  difference  between  credit  ratings  and 
CDS spreads (and also bond spreads) is the frequency at 
which they change. While CDS and bond spreads poten-
tially change on a daily basis, credit ratings are revised 
infrequently, as credit rating agencies have rating stability 
as one of their objectives. If all three measures of credit 
risk  were  based  on  the  same  information,  we  would 
expect credit rating changes to lag behind CDS and bond 
spread  changes.  However,  as  mentioned  above,  credit 
rating agencies also base their ratings on private informa-
tion which is potentially not reflected in CDS and bond 
spreads. As a result, it is possible that rating changes lead 
CDS and bond spread changes.
Several  papers  focusing  on  bond  spreads  (see  Norden 
and Weber, 2004, for a review) have found that the bond 
market anticipates negative but not positive rating events. 
Interestingly, two studies (Hull et al., 2004, and Norden 
and Weber, 2004) have confirmed these findings for the 
CDS market using a set of mostly non-financial firms.
Box 1 further investigates the relationship between CDS 
spreads and credit ratings for a set of European and US 
banks. Understanding whether market indicators such as 
CDS spreads anticipate rating changes is important for at 
least three reasons. First, from a financial stability perspec-
tive, it is important to understand whether CDS spreads 
are an effective tool to detect and forecast changes in 
banks’ financial condition (assuming than this is proxied 
by credit rating events). Second, from the point of view 
of credit rating agencies, it may be interesting to learn 
whether credit ratings (which are mostly based on public 
information  and  reviewed  infrequently)  may  see  their 
accuracy improved when supplemented with information 
from  the  CDS  market.  Third,  from  an  investor’s  stand-
point, it might be interesting to exploit signals coming 
from CDS spreads if they lead credit rating events.156
Box 1  –    The relationship between CDS spreads and credit ratings for 
European and US banks
The purpose of this box is to study the lead-lag relationship between two measures of credit risk (CDS spreads and 
long-term credit ratings) for a set of banks and, more particularly, to see whether CDS spreads anticipate credit 
rating events.
The sample consists of daily CDS spreads and long-term ratings from Moody’s for 83 banks over the period from 
1 January 2003 to 22 October 2008. Both European and US credit institutions are included in the sample, in 
order to have the largest possible number of credit rating events (a forthcoming NBB working paper provides 
more  information  on  the  sample  design  and  composition).  Unsurprisingly,  positive  rating  events  (defined  as 
upgrades, positive outlooks and reviews for upgrade) dominate the 2004 to 2006 period whereas negative events 
(defined as downgrades, negative outlooks and reviews for downgrade) are much more prevalent in 2007 and 
2008. An interesting feature of the sample is that it is characterised by much larger movements in CDS spreads 
than those observed in Hull et al. (2004) and Norden and Weber (2004), particularly at the end of the period   
considered.
The  empirical  analysis  is  conducted  by  implementing  an  event-study  methodology  and  bootstrap  technique 
employed by Hull et al. (2004). We first create an adjusted CDS spread for each bank by subtracting a CDS market 
index spread from the bank’s CDS spread. We then consider the changes in adjusted CDS spreads that occur over 
different time intervals (e.g. [-90 days, -61 days], [-60 days, -31 days], etc.) preceding and following the day on 
which a particular rating event takes place, defined as event time day zero.  (1) The table below reports the results 
of this exercise.
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Mean change in the adjusted cds spread during an interval prior to or following a rating event  















Downgrades N. of events : 15
Mean 22.447** 24.445* 58.779* –14.845 13.273
p  -values 0.020 0.064 0.065 0.745 0.367
Negative outlooks and  
reviews for downgrade
N. of events : 32
Mean –0.460 8.785 27.469*** –1.469 6.184**
p  -values 0.534 0.146 0.008 0.560 0.030
Upgrades N. of events : 12
Mean 1.227 2.436 –0.425 –1.942** 0.701
p  -values 0.703 0.916 0.454 0.010 0.756
Positive outlooks and  
reviews for upgrade
N. of events : 16
Mean –8.592*** 6.352 –5.741** –1.510** –0.875
p  -values 0.004 0.976 0.018 0.042 0.202
Note :   The time interval [–n1, –n2] is from n1 business days before the rating event to n2 business days before the rating event. The time interval [1, 10] is from 1 day 
after the rating event to 10 days after the rating event. The adjusted CDS spread is the actual CDS spread observed on a given day adjusted for a CDS market  
index. The test considers whether the adjusted CDS spread change for a rating event over a given interval is significantly greater than (smaller than) zero for  
negative (positive) events. Values significant at 1 p.c., 5 p.c., 10 p.c. are identified by ***, **, *.
 
(1)    Note that we disregard a rating event when it follows the previous event by less than 90 days in order to avoid as far as possible contaminating our results.157
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2.    The determinants of CDS spreads
Credit  risk  should  be  the  most  important  determinant 
of  CDS  spreads,  as  credit  default  swaps  are  insurance 
premia against default of the underlying reference entity. 
However,  other  factors  related  to  liquidity  or  general 
economic  conditions  may  also  play  a  role.  This  section 
discusses more fully variables which are likely to explain 
the behaviour of CDS spreads in general, but with an eye 
on the banking sector.
2.1    Variables implied by structural credit risk models
We begin with credit risk factors. In this article, credit risk 
is proxied by the variables suggested by structural credit 
risk  models  initiated  by  Black  and  Scholes  (1973)  and 
Merton (1974), i.e. the risk-free interest rate, leverage and 
asset volatility (see Box 2).
The results in the table show that, in line with the existing literature, negative rating events are anticipated by 
the CDS market. Anticipation in the CDS market is present in the case of actual downgrades, as we observe a 
significant increase (at the 5 p.c. or 10 p.c. statistical significance level) in the CDS spreads from 90 trading days 
before the downgrade event (day zero). Interestingly, uncertainty about the rating downgrade seems to wane, as 
prices rise more when we move closer to the downgrade announcement. A similar but somewhat weaker pattern 
is observed for negative outlooks and reviews for downgrade : CDS spreads increase significantly (at the 1 p.c. 
statistical significance level) only in the 30 days preceding the rating event.  (1)
As far as positive rating events are concerned, the table reveals some anticipation by the CDS market, mostly of the 
positive outlooks and reviews for upgrade. However, although the results for these types of events are statistically 
significant, they are small from an economic point of view, as CDS spread changes are all lower than 10 bps in 
absolute value (compared to at least 22 bps for the negative rating events). This result is in line with the existing 
literature whose main conclusion is that the market anticipates positive rating events to a much smaller extent 
than negative ones.
There are at least two possible reasons for the stronger anticipation of negative rating events by the CDS market. 
First, bad news (which drives negative rating events) may have a larger impact than positive news on investors, 
thereby  translating  into  a  stronger  effect  on  spreads.  Second,  downgrades  are  associated  with  larger  rating 
changes than upgrades in our sample, as evidenced by the fact that only 1 out of the 12 upgrades represents 
a two-notch rating move, while 5 out of the 15 downgrades are two-notch or three-notch rating changes. We 
expect the CDS market to anticipate more strongly news which is of a higher importance.
Finally, it is important to point out that our results are also consistent with the fact that credit rating agencies may 
simply adjust their ratings following changes in CDS spreads. Moody’s (2006 and 2007) argues for instance that 
the market and its own credit ratings react in the same way to news about a company, but that the market moves 
first and instantaneously, thereby creating a gap between the ratings and the trading levels for the CDS. Moody’s 
subsequently reacts to reduce this gap if news about the issuer is confirmed. The more significant the news and 
the larger the gap between Moody’s credit rating and the market, the higher the probability that Moody’s will act.
(1)    The evidence of a post-announcement effect for negative outlooks and reviews for downgrade does not seem to be robust, as shifting the post-announcement time 
interval by only 2 days (i.e. from [+ 1 day, + 10 days] to [+ 3 days, +12 days] or [- 1 day, + 8 days]) returns insignificant results. Note that all our other results hold up 
to this type of robustness check.158
Box 2  –  The Merton model
Miller and Modigliani (1958) used no arbitrage arguments to derive their well-known irrelevance theorem regard-
ing the use of risk-free debt versus equity. In an economy with neither taxes nor default costs, the total value of 
the firm is invariant to the capital structure. In the subsequent decade, the potential default costs were introduced 
and hence theorists started to treat debt as a risky asset. Still, little guidance was given on the valuation of risky 
debt. Black and Scholes (1973) and Merton (1973, 1974) initiated in their seminal papers the classical theory of 
risky debt valuation (also called the contingent claim approach or the structural approach).
Merton (1974) considers a firm with an extremely simplified capital structure. This firm has one single homogene-
ous class of debt outstanding, a zero-coupon bond of nominal value B. The firm promises to pay B on maturity 
date T. Prior to T, the firm cannot default, issue new senior debt, pay out any cash dividends or make share repur-
chases. The value of the firm’s asset (A) is assumed to follow a diffusion process. The value of the firm is critical 
for the pay-offs the bond holder will receive at maturity date. If the asset value is higher than the nominal value 
of the bond, the bond will be repaid and the market value of the equity position will be the residual claim of the 
difference between the asset value at maturity (A(T)) and B. However, if the asset value is not sufficient to repay 
B, the bond holder will get the remaining asset value A(T) (< B) whereas the equity holder will invoke his limited 
liability. The following table summarises the cash flows :
The pay-off structure clearly reveals that the position of the equity holder can be described as a long European 
call on the assets with the nominal value of the zero-coupon bond (B) as strike price.  (1) The position of the risky 
bond holder is equivalent to a position in a risk-free bond with the same maturity and a short European put on 
the assets of the firm. The strike price is also B.
By viewing corporate liabilities as options on the assets of the firm and using the Black and Scholes formula for 
pricing European put options, Merton (1974) explicitly linked the value of credit risky securities to three variables : 
the risk-free interest rate, the volatility of the firm’s asset value and leverage.
The intuition for each of these variables is as follows. Since bond holders can be thought of as having shorted a put 
on the assets of the firm, they must be rewarded for the risk that they take. First, higher asset volatility increases 
the probability that the firm will default on its debt and that the put option will be exercised. Therefore, investors 
will demand a higher premium to hold corporate debt. Second, the higher the leverage, the more likely it becomes 
that the firm’s assets will drop below the nominal value of its debt at maturity. Again, the higher probability of 
default will imply a higher risk premium. Finally, a higher risk-free rate makes the firm value process drift at a faster 
rate from the default boundary, and thus reduces default probability. A lower risk premium thus follows.






A (T) > B B A (T) – B
     
A (T) < B A (T) 0
     
Pay-off 
 
min (B, A (T)) 
= 
B – max (B – A (T), 0)
A (T) – min (A (T), B) 
= 
max (A (T) – B, 0)
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RiSK-FREE intERESt RatE
In the Merton model, the risk-free interest rate represents 
the drift of the value of the assets. An increase in the 
interest rate implies an increase in the expected growth 
rate of the firm’s value. This leads to decreasing credit 
spreads as default becomes less likely.
The  negative  relationship  between  the  risk-free   
interest rate and credit spreads can also be explained in a 
macroeconomic setting. Higher interest rates are usually 
associated with higher economic growth, which should 
therefore  lead  to  lower  default  risk  hence  lower  credit 
spreads. In the long run, however, higher interest rates 
may also lead to higher funding costs, which may reduce 
the negative association between the risk-free rate and 
credit spreads.
lEvERagE
In the Merton model, the debt-to-asset ratio (leverage) has 
a positive impact on the credit spread. A higher leverage 
ratio implies that the asset value can less easily cover debt 
repayments, increasing the probability of default and credit 
spreads. Hence, structural credit risk models posit a nega-
tive relation between the firm’s asset value and its credit 
spreads.
As the market value of firms’ assets cannot be observed, 
this value is usually proxied by the equity value (returns) 
for  publicly-traded  companies.  If  stock  returns  fall,  the 
leverage in terms of market value will increase. In turn, 
higher leverage leads to higher credit spreads. A negative 
relation between stock returns and credit spreads is thus 
expected.
aSSEt vOlatility
Higher  asset  volatility  leads  to  higher  credit  spreads 
because it increases the likelihood that the firm’s asset 
value will fall below the value of the required debt repay-
ment. In practice, asset volatility is often proxied by equity 
volatility. An increase in equity volatility thus raises the 
probability that the credit spreads will widen.
2.2  CDS market liquidity
Several papers have documented that CDS spreads seem to 
be too high to be explained simply by the variables implied 
by structural credit risk models and that factors linked to 
CDS market liquidity are also likely to play a role (see, e.g., 
Bongaerts et al., 2008, and Tang and Yan, 2008).
We  therefore  introduce  a  bank-specific  CDS  liquidity 
factor  and  measure  it  as  the  bid-ask  spread,  i.e.  the 
difference  between  the  bid  and  ask  quotes.  Arguably, 
liquidity has multiple facets and can only be imperfectly 
described by a single statistic. Our choice to use the bid-
ask spread is primarily motivated by the lack of data on 
other proxies of CDS market liquidity ; however, there are 
a number of reasons for relying on this indicator. First, the 
above-mentioned  papers  report  substantial  correlations 
between  the  bid-ask  spread  and  other  liquidity  proxies 
(e.g. number of quotes per CDS, data on trades or volume 
of orders). Second, unreported regressions show that the 
CDS bid-ask spread appears to be unrelated to the other 
determinants of CDS spreads in our sample. This suggests 
that  the  bid-ask  spread  broadly  captures  CDS  market 
liquidity  and  is  not  being  “contaminated”  by  variables 
implied by structural credit risk models and by general 
economic variables.
As protection sellers demand an additional premium for 
liquidity risk, higher bid-ask spreads are expected to be 
associated with higher CDS premia.
2.3    Variables reflecting general economic conditions
Most papers exploring the explanatory power of credit 
risk  and  liquidity  variables  for  bond  and  CDS  spreads 
find that regression residuals still contain some degree of 
common variation, indicating that some common factors 
are missing from the regression specification (see, e.g., 
Collin-Dufresne et al., 2001, for bond spreads). It is likely 
that such common variation reflects factors such as sys-
tematic credit risk or risk aversion, which vary according to 
the state of the business cycle. It is still an open question 
why these factors are significant, since one would expect 
their effects to have already been captured by individual 
credit risk variables.
The  following  conjectures  can  nevertheless  be  made. 
First,  systematic  credit  risk  may  impact  CDS  spread 
changes  because  the  probability  of  default  increases 
(and  the  recovery  rate  decreases)  in  periods  of  eco-
nomic downturn ; hence the risk premium may increase. 
Second, risk aversion may matter because investors are 
more  concerned  with  safety  in  periods  of  economic 
downturn,  so  the  required  risk  premium  may  also 
increase.
Given  this  evidence  and  the  associated  conjectures, 
we  introduce  several  variables  that  are  known  to 
proxy for business conditions, market conditions and/or 
uncertainty.160
SlOPE OF tHE tERm StRuctuRE
The slope of the term structure (the spread between the 
long-term  and  the  short-term  rate)  is  widely  acknowl-
edged as a business cycle predictor (see, e.g., Mishkin, 
2007).  A  high  slope  anticipates  improving  economic 
activity, which might in turn increase a firm’s growth rate 
and reduce its default probability. Therefore, a negative 
relation with credit spreads is expected. A negative rela-
tion can also be inferred from the expectations hypothesis 
of the term structure, which states that an increase in 
the slope implies an increase in the expected short-term 
interest rates. Similarly to the discussion of the risk-free 
interest rate above, an increase in the slope is expected to 
reduce a firm’s default risk.
SWaP SPREaDS anD cORPORatE bOnD SPREaDS
The  swap  spread  (i.e.  the  difference  between  a  swap 
rate and a government bond rate of the same maturity) 
reflects the perceived risk that swap counterparties will 
fail. Similar to Düllmann and Sosinska (2007), we use the 
swap spread as an indicator of credit risk in the bank-
ing sector, since banks are the most active dealers in the 
swap market. A positive expected relation with bank CDS 
spreads thus follows.
Like  several  other  studies  (e.g.  Collin-Dufresne  et  al., 
2001), we consider the bond yield spread between high- 
and low-rated securities as a general indicator of credit 
risk in the economy and therefore expect a positive impact 
on CDS spreads.
StOcK maRKEt REtuRn
General business climate improvements (as proxied by an 
increase in the stock market return) will reduce probabili-
ties of default and will increase recovery rates. A negative 
relation with CDS spreads thus follows.
StOcK maRKEt vOlatility
Volatility in the stock market is used as a measure of eco-
nomic uncertainty, the assumption being that the more 
volatile the market, the more uncertainty there is about 
economic  prospects.  A  positive  relationship  between 
stock  market  volatility  and  CDS  spreads  is  therefore 
expected.
In the remainder of this article, we analyse the role of 
the  above-mentioned  factors  in  explaining  CDS  spread 
changes for a sample of large euro area banks, the com-
position of which is detailed in the next section.
3.    Data description and model 
specification
3.1  Data description
The analysis uses individual CDS data for 31 listed euro 
area  banks  over  the  period  from  1  January  2004  to 
22 October 2008.  (1) The selection of the banks was based 
on  the  availability  of  CDS  quotes  and  stock  prices  in 
Datastream.  (2)
We use 5-year CDS quotes for senior debt issues since 
these contracts are generally considered to be the most 
liquid segment of the market. In addition, we work with 
mid-quotes, which correspond to market-observed (and 
not extrapolated) spreads, and we use weekly changes, 
since daily CDS spreads are known to be scanty (see, e.g., 
Zhu, 2006). Finally, only underlying names with at least 
10 weekly credit spread changes are retained, resulting 
in an unbalanced panel of 5,214 observations with on 
average 20.6 spreads available per week. We also make 
use of data on the long-term rating of each bank, which 
enables results for banks in different rating categories to 
be compared.
Table  1  presents  some  descriptive  statistics  on  weekly 
CDS spread changes of banks across rating categories. In 
order to account for any structural change that may have 
occurred after the outbreak of the financial crisis, statistics 
are not only reported for the entire sample period, but 
also for the following two sub-periods : 1 January 2004 
to 15 July 2007 (“pre-crisis period”) and 16 July 2007 to 
22 October 2008 (“crisis period”).  (3)
Table 1 shows that the average CDS spread change was 
0.44 basis points per week over the entire sample period. 
The descriptive statistics confirm that bank credit spreads 
varied much more after the crisis began. Furthermore, the 
volatility (standard deviation) of CDS spread changes is 
higher for A- than for AA-rated banks, both in the pre-
crisis and in the crisis period. Finally, and somewhat sur-
prisingly, average CDS spread changes are slightly higher 
for AA- than A-rated banks.
(1)    Including bank CDS spreads after the end of October 2008 would cause the 
results to be affected by different government interventions whose application to 
specific banks is not always identifiable.
(2)  The exact composition of the sample is as follows: Dexia, KBC (BE) ; BNP Paribas, 
Crédit Agricole, Natixis, Société Générale, Unibail (FR) ; Bayerische Hypo- und 
Vereinsbank, Commerzbank, Deutsche Bank, IKB Deutsche Industriebank (DE) ; 
Banco de Sabadell, Banco Santander, Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria (ES) ;  
EFG Eurobank Ergasias (GR) ; Allied Irish Banks, Anglo Irish Bank, Bank of Ireland, 
Irish Life & Permanent (IE) ; Banca Italease, Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena, 
Banca Popolare di Milano, Banco Popolare, Mediobanca, Ubi Banca, UniCredito 
Italiano (IT) ; ING, Fortis Netherlands (NL) ; Banco BPI, Banco Comercial Português, 
Banco Espirito Santo (PT).
(3)  As mentioned in Section 1, the week of 16 July 2007 is the week during which 
Bear Stearns disclosed that two of its subprime hedge funds had lost nearly all of 
their value amid a rapid decline in the market for subprime mortgages, an event 
seen by many as signalling the start of the crisis.161
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Table  1  Descriptive statistics on weekly bank cDs spreaD changes : 










whole period : 1 January 2004 – 22 october 2008
Mean  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.44 0.40 0.37 0.85
Minimum   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –251.20 –155.00 –251.20 –143.30
Maximum  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262.50 156.70 262.50 112.50
Std. Deviation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13.49 11.98 14.32 15.95
N(obs)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5,214 2,488 2,071 655
pre-crisis period : 1 January 2004 – 15 July 2007
Mean  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –0.05 –0.03 –0.05 –0.09
Minimum   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –18.90 –4.30 –14.50 –18.90
Maximum  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19.70 9.80 17.00 19.70
Std. Deviation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.46 0.94 1.75 1.96
N(obs)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,782 1,798 1,490 494
crisis period : 16 July 2007 – 22 october 2008
Mean  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.73 1.52 1.43 3.72
Minimum   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –251.20 –155.00 –251.20 –143.30
Maximum  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 262.50 156.70 262.50 112.50
Std. Deviation  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25.59 22.67 26.89 31.89
N(obs)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,432 690 581 161
Note :   The table reports the mean, minimum, maximum, standard deviation (in basis points) and number of CDS spread changes on respectively the entire sample of banks,  
AA- and A-rated banks, as well as banks without a long-term rating (including 9 observations with a BBB rating). CDS spreads are from Datastream and long-term  
credit ratings are from Fitch Ratings.
 








D  it Change in 2-year euro area government bond yield –
Ri,t Bank stock return –
D  voli,t Change in weekly historical standard deviation, computed using daily bank stock  
returns +
D  liqi,t Change in absolute CDS bid-ask spread +
D  slopet Change in the slope of the term structure, i.e. change in the difference between  
the 10-year minus the 5-year euro area government bond yield –
D  swapt Change in 5-year swap spread, i.e. change in the difference between the 5-year  
European swap rate and the 5-year euro area government bond yield +
D  bspreadt Change in the difference between the Merrill Lynch 5-year BBB and AAA corporate  
bond spread +
R  m,t Stock market return, proxied by the Datastream euro area stock market index return –
D  volimpt Change in stock market volatility, computed using the weekly change of the VSTOXX  
index +
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3.2    Model specification
In order to analyse the main determinants of weekly CDS 
spread changes, we estimate the following equation :
∆CDSi,t = α1 + α2 ∆it + α3 Ri,t + α4 ∆voli,t + α5 ∆liqi,t 
+  α6  ∆slopet  +  α7  ∆swapt  +  α8  ∆bspreadt  +  α9  Rm,t 
+ α10 ∆volimpt + εi,t
where the subscripts i and t identify respectively the bank 
and the time period ; ∆ denotes weekly changes ; CDS 
is the bank CDS spread ; the variable i is the 2-year euro 
area government bond yield ; R and vol are the bank stock 
return and its volatility (both measured on a weekly basis), 
liq is the CDS bid-ask spread ; slope is the spread between 
the  10-year  and  5-year  euro  area  government  bond 
yield ; swap is the spread between the 5-year European 
swap  rate  and  the  5-year  euro  area  government  bond 
yield ; bspread is the spread between the 5-year BBB- and 
AAA-rated corporate bond spreads ; Rm and volimp are 
the  stock  market  return  and  its  volatility  (both  meas-
ured on a weekly basis).  (1) All variables are expressed in 
percentage points, except CDS which is in basis points. 
Table 2 provides the exact definition of all the explanatory 
variables and the expected signs of their coefficients.
Table 3 reports summary statistics for each variable, for 
the whole period and for the two sub-periods.
As shown in the table, the crisis period was accompanied 
by an increase in credit risk (as reflected by the negative 
change in interest rates, negative bank stock returns and 
positive change in volatility), worsening liquidity conditions 
in the CDS market (positive change in the bid-ask spread) 
and  deteriorating  general  economic  conditions  (positive 




















whole period : 1 January 2004 – 22 october 2008
Mean  . . . . . . . . . . . 0.00 –0.04 0.04 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.06 0.16
Minimum   . . . . . . . . –0.58 –81.09 –22.93 –75.00 –0.19 –0.15 –0.51 –10.98 –8.90
Maximum  . . . . . . . 0.41 73.42 33.67 100.00 0.16 0.23 0.66 5.12 15.99
Std. Deviation  . . . . 0.12 5.09 1.59 4.27 0.04 0.04 0.09 2.26 2.95
N(obs)  . . . . . . . . . . 5,214 5,214 5,214 4,802 5,214 5,214 4,885 5,214 5,214
pre-crisis period : 1 January 2004 – 15 July 2007
Mean  . . . . . . . . . . . 0.01 0.46 0.00 –0.01 –0.01 0.00 0.00 0.39 –0.06
Minimum   . . . . . . . . –0.22 –11.61 –10.97 –25.00 –0.18 –0.13 –0.34 –6.55 –8.90
Maximum  . . . . . . . 0.25 32.24 9.71 25.00 0.07 0.06 0.43 4.45 11.69
Std. Deviation  . . . . 0.08 2.78 0.77 1.87 0.03 0.02 0.07 1.70 2.03
N(obs)  . . . . . . . . . . 3,782 3,782 3,782 3,463 3,782 3,782 3,453 3,782 3,782
crisis period : 16 July 2007 – 22 october 2008
Mean  . . . . . . . . . . . –0.02 –1.37 0.15 0.34 0.01 0.01 0.03 –0.82 0.73
Minimum   . . . . . . . . –0.58 –81.09 –22.93 –75.00 –0.19 –0.15 –0.51 –10.98 –8.63
Maximum  . . . . . . . 0.41 73.42 33.67 100.00 0.16 0.23 0.66 5.12 15.99
Std. Deviation  . . . . 0.18 8.45 2.76 7.49 0.07 0.06 0.13 3.15 4.51
N(obs)  . . . . . . . . . . 1,432 1,432 1,432 1,339 1,432 1,432 1,432 1,432 1,432
t  -test : pre-crisis vs. crisis period
t  -test value  . . . . . . –7.17*** –8.04*** 1.94* 1.69* 7.06*** 5.00*** 8.87*** –13.84*** 6.34***
Note :   The table reports the mean, minimum, maximum, standard deviation (in p.c.) and number of observations on each explanatory variable. All variables are measured  
on a weekly basis and are summarised in Table 2. The last row presents the results of t  -tests for the equality of the means of each explanatory variable across 
the pre-crisis and crisis periods ; ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1 p.c., 5 p.c. and 10 p.c. levels, respectively.
 
(1)    We tried different maturities for it, slopet and swapt, with very similar results to 
those reported in the article.163
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corporate bond and swap spread changes, negative stock 
market returns and strong increase in stock market volatil-
ity).  (1)  The  existence  of  a  significant  difference  between 
the pre-crisis and the crisis periods is further confirmed by 
the last row of Table 3, which reports the results of t-tests 
for the equality of the means of each explanatory variable 
across the sub-periods. These tests show that the differ-
ences in means across the sub- periods were all statistically 
significant at the 10 p.c. level and often at the 1 p.c. level.
Finally,  an  informal  comparison  of  the  standard  devia-
tions  of  each  variable  between  the  pre-crisis  and  crisis 
periods suggests that the volatility of all of these variables 
increased strongly after mid-July 2007.
4.    Empirical results
We estimate the model using ordinary least squares with 
White  cross-section  standard  errors  and  covariance  to 
allow for general contemporaneous correlation between 
the bank residuals.  (2)
Table  4  presents  the  estimation  results  for  the  whole 
period and our full sample of banks, as well as results 
for  sub-samples  based  on  time  periods  (pre-crisis  and 
crisis) and credit ratings (AA and A). The last column of 
the table reports the results of a t-test for equality of the 
coefficients in the pre-crisis and crisis periods.
Table 5 provides information on the marginal contribu-
tions of each variable (in percent) to the overall explana-
tory power of our regressions for the different time peri-
ods and rating categories considered.
4.1    Variables implied by structural credit risk models
Looking at Table 4, variables proxying for credit risk are 
generally  statistically  insignificant  at  the  5  p.c.  level, 
except the change in the risk-free rate (∆it) in the regres-
sion for AA-rated banks (pre-crisis period) and the bank 
stock  return  (Ri,t)  in  the  regression  for  A-rated  banks 
(whole sample period), both with the expected negative 
sign.  The  R-squared  decomposition  in  Table  5  further 
shows that the marginal contribution of the credit risk 
variables to the R-squared never exceeds about 20 p.c. in 
the regressions.
The insignificance of the credit risk variables in the pre-cri-
sis period echoes warning signals concerning the “global 
mispricing of risk” sent by several observers before the 
crisis struck. The insignificance of these variables in the 
crisis period is somewhat more surprising.
One reason for the insignificance of the credit risk vari-
ables may be that structural credit risk models are less 
applicable to banks than non-banks given the proxy that 
we use for leverage (stock return). However, there are at 
least two additional explanations. First, this article focuses 
on high credit-quality banks (almost exclusively rated A or 
above), while existing studies which find that credit risk 
variables play an important role in explaining CDS spreads 
often consider firms (banks and most often non-banks) of 
much lower credit quality (typically rated BBB or below). 
Obviously, credit risk variables are more likely to matter for 
low credit-quality firms, as they are closer to the default 
barrier. Second, we report results for relatively long time 
periods, which increases the likelihood of obtaining insig-
nificant results if the coefficients are time-varying. One-
year rolling regressions reported in a companion working 
paper (Annaert et al., forthcoming) show precisely that 
the  statistical  significance  of  the  credit  risk  variables  is 
highly time-dependent.
This  last  result  shed  light  on  those  by  Raunig  and 
Scheicher (2009), who contrast the behaviour of financial 
and non-financial CDS spreads during two main periods 
(October 2003 to June 2007 and August to December 
2007). Regarding the first sub-period, which is very similar 
to ours, the authors find that the risk-free rate and the idi-
osyncratic volatility affect bank CDS premia only to a small 
extent. Regarding the second sub-period, which is much 
shorter than ours, the authors find that the impact of the 
risk-free  rate  and  idiosyncratic  volatility  is  identical  for 
banks and non-banks (i.e. negative and significant for the 
first variable, and positive and significant for the second). 
Interestingly, when we shorten the crisis period to August 
to December 2007, we also find that the risk-free rate and 
the idiosyncratic volatility are significant with the expected 
sign. It thus seems that the relationship between variables 
implied  by  structural  credit  risk  models  and  bank  CDS 
spreads was quite strong in the first few months of the 
crisis but that it disintegrated afterwards.
4.2    CDS market liquidity
Looking  at  Table  4,  the  change  in  CDS  bid-ask  spread 
(∆liqi,t)  is  insignificant  in  the  pre-crisis  period  but  is 
significant  with  the  expected  positive  sign  in  the  crisis 
period  for  the  two  rating  categories  considered.  The 
R-squared decomposition in Table 5 further shows that 
(1)    Note, however, that the positive slope of the yield curve in the crisis period 
suggests an improvement in general economic conditions.
(2)  We rely on ordinary least squares because we find no evidence of bank fixed or 
random effects.164
Table  4  Determinants of weekly bank CDs spreaD Changes : breakDown by CreDit rating anD time perioD
 
Whole period :  
1 Jan. 2004 – 22 Oct. 2008
 
Pre-crisis period :  
1 Jan. 2004 – 15 Jul. 2007
 
Crisis period :  
16 Jul. 2007 – 22 Oct. 2008
 
t  -test 
pre-crisis vs. crisis period
 
panel a : all banks
Credit risk
D  it  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –12.71 –1.04 –10.47 –0.68
(–1.54) (–0.84) (–0.76)
R  i,t  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –0.44 0.00 –0.49 –1.46
(–1.54) (–0.12) (–1.47)
D  voli,t  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –1.03 –0.03 –1.22 –1.32
(–1.27) (–0.36) (–1.36)
CDS market liquidity
D  liqi,t  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.82*** 0.02 0.92*** 3.73***
(4.04) (0.77) (3.80)
General economic conditions
D  slopet  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –39.13* –4.79 –26.21 –0.61
(–1.89) (–1.34) (–0.75)
D  swapt  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116.87*** 10.17* 115.34*** 4.81***
(5.89) (1.79) (5.45)
D  bspreadt   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –10.95 3.77*** –22.28** –2.56**
(–1.60) (2.73) (–2.21)
R  m,t   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –0.49 –0.03 –1.19 –1.34
(–1.03) (–0.53) (–1.37)
D  volimpt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –0.01 0.00 –0.01 –1.57
(–1.09) (0.72) (–1.50)
Adj. R2 (in p.c.)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27.79 4.72 31.03
N(obs)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4,484 3,145 1,339
panel b : aa-rated banks
Credit risk
D  it  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –13.94 0.14 –13.09 –0.71
(–1.26) (0.14) (–0.70)
R  i,t  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –0.57 –0.05*** –0.67 –1.47
(–1.56) (–3.39) (–1.58)
D  voli,t  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –0.81 0.03 –0.93 –0.86
(–0.80) (0.47) (–0.83)
CDS market liquidity
D  liqi,t  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.56* 0.00 0.76* 1.71*
(1.79) (0.40) (1.71)
General economic conditions
D  slopet  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –46.45* –0.89 –37.71 –0.78
(–1.66) (–0.31) (–0.80)
D  swapt  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149.16*** 5.22 154.23*** 5.08***
(5.60) (1.01) (5.33)
D  bspreadt   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –8.17 3.32*** –17.25 –1.61
(–0.97) (3.51) (–1.35)
R  m,t   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –0.69 –0.02 –1.45 –1.36
(–1.21) (–0.33) (–1.38)
D  volimpt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –0.01* 0.00 –0.02** –2.09**
(–1.66) (–0.12) (–2.10)
Adj. R2 (in p.c.)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30.60 8.09 34.89
N(obs)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,143 1,491 652
Note :   Panels A, B and C present the estimation results for CDS spreads on respectively the whole sample of banks, AA- and A-rated banks. The model is estimated using  
ordinary least squares with White cross-section standard errors and covariance to allow for general contemporaneous correlation between the bank residuals. t  -statistics 
are given between brackets. The t  -statistics in the last column refer to the t  -statistics of a test for equality of the coefficients in the pre-crisis and crisis periods ; 
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1 p.c., 5 p.c. and 10 p.c. levels, respectively.
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the contribution of the bid-ask spread to the variance in 
CDS spread changes explained by the model surged after 
mid-July 2007, especially for A-rated banks.
These  results  are  not  inconsistent  with  existing  studies 
on non-banks, which show that the CDS bid-ask spread 
does help in explaining CDS spreads, but that its impact 
depends  on  the  sample  considered  or  the  explanatory 
variables chosen (see, e.g., Tang and Yan, 2008, and Das 
and Hanouna, 2009). Our results suggest that an addi-
tional dimension driving the significance of the bid-ask 
spread is the time period considered.
The  insignificance  of  the  bid-ask  spread  in  the  pre-crisis 
period may be attributed to the global mispricing of risk 
noted by several observers. The significance of this variable 
after  mid-July  2007  suggests  that  the  liquidity  premium 
earned by protection sellers in the CDS market has increased 
in recent months, especially for lower-rated banks.
Table  4  Determinants of weekly bank CDs spreaD Changes : breakDown by CreDit rating anD time perioD (continued)
 
Whole period :  
1 Jan. 2004 – 22 Oct. 2008
 
Pre-crisis period :  
1 Jan. 2004 – 15 Jul. 2007
 
Crisis period :  
16 Jul. 2007 – 22 Oct. 2008
 
t  -test 
pre-crisis vs. crisis period
 
panel C : a-rated banks
Credit risk
D  it  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –12.78** –1.58 –11.66 –0.93
(–1.99) (–0.99) (–1.09)
R  i,t  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –0.38 0.00 –0.45 –1.49
(–1.47) (–0.12) (–1.49)
D  voli,t  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –1.02 –0.02 –1.26 –1.50
(–1.34) (–0.30) (–1.52)
CDS market liquidity
D  liqi,t  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.17*** 0.08 1.22*** 3.25***
(3.71) (1.53) (3.49)
General economic conditions
D  slopet  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –41.77** –7.06* –27.40 –0.66
(–2.10) (–1.69) (–0.89)
D  swapt  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113.25*** 12.19** 108.77*** 5.03***
(6.10) (2.19) (5.90)
D  bspreadt   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –16.28* 5.53*** –31.68*** –3.53***
(–1.90) (2.93) (–3.05)
R  m,t   . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . –0.18 –0.08 –0.56 –0.65
(–0.44) (–1.02) (–0.75)
D  volimpt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 0.00 0.00 0.00 –0.21
(0.02) (0.45) (–0.14)
Adj. R2 (in p.c.)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36.48 6.98 39.44
N(obs)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,794 1,241 553
Note :   Panels A, B and C present the estimation results for CDS spreads on respectively the whole sample of banks, AA- and A-rated banks. The model is estimated using  
ordinary least squares with White cross-section standard errors and covariance to allow for general contemporaneous correlation between the bank residuals. t  -statistics 
are given between brackets. The t  -statistics in the last column refer to the t  -statistics of a test for equality of the coefficients in the pre-crisis and crisis periods ; 
***, ** and * denote significance at the 1 p.c., 5 p.c. and 10 p.c. levels, respectively.
 
4.3    Variables reflecting general economic conditions
Looking at each variable in turn, the following observa-
tions can be made in Table 4.
First,  the  coefficient  on  the  slope  of  the  term  structure 
(∆slopet) has the expected negative sign but is only signifi-
cant in the regressions which cover the entire sample period. 
One possible explanation might be that the impact of this 
variable can only be assessed over sufficiently long time peri-
ods, which include substantial movements in the yield curve.
Second,  the  regression  coefficient  on  the  swap  spread 
(∆swapt)  is  generally  significant  across  sub-periods  and 
it has the expected positive sign. This coefficient is much 
larger  in  the  crisis  period  than  in  the  pre-crisis  period. 
Indeed,  looking  at  the  results  for  the  entire  sample  of 
banks, an increase of 13 bps (i.e., one standard deviation) 
in the swap spread change leads to an increase of 15 bps 
in bank CDS spread changes after the start of the crisis, 166
Table  5  Marginal contribution of variables proxying for credit risk, cds Market liquidity 
and general econoMic conditions to the percentage of total explained variance
 
Whole period :  
1 Jan. 2004 – 22 Oct. 2008
 
Pre-crisis period :  
1 Jan. 2004 – 15 Jul. 2007
 
Crisis period :  
16 Jul. 2007 – 22 Oct. 2008
 
panel a : all banks
Credit risk  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21.75 17.75 14.93
CDS market liquidity  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35.11 9.40 55.37
General economic conditions  . . . . . . . . . . 43.14 72.85 29.70
panel b : aa-rated banks
Credit risk  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.72 11.51 3.54
CDS market liquidity  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22.53 19.69 26.71
General economic conditions  . . . . . . . . . . 73.74 68.79 69.75
panel c : a-rated banks
Credit risk  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20.46 16.10 15.85
CDS market liquidity  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35.52 9.70 52.70
General economic conditions  . . . . . . . . . . 44.02 74.21 31.45
Note :   This table shows the marginal contribution (in p.c.) of each block of variables (credit risk variables, liquidity variable and variables proxying for general economic conditions)   
to the total adjusted R  2 of the regression relative to the contribution of the two other blocks of variables. Formally, the marginal contribution mck of the k  th block of   
variables (k = 1, 2, 3  ) is defined as :   
  R  2 – R  2
k
S  n
k = 1 (  R  2 – R  2
k  )
 ,   where mck is ≥ 0 and R  2
k is computed with the k  th block of variables excluded. Credit risk variables are D  it , R  i,t and D  voli,t  ; CDS market liquidity is measured   
by D  liqi,t  ; variables reflecting general economic conditions are D  slopet , D  swapt , D  bspreadt , R  m,t and D  volimpt . Table 2 provides the exact definition of   
all the explanatory variables.
 
compared with only 1 bps before. The much larger coef-
ficient observed in the crisis period might be attributed 
to a re-pricing of credit risk in the banking sector, with 
changes  in  the  likelihood  of  bank  failure  (as  measured 
by the swap spread) translating into higher CDS spreads 
changes after mid-July 2007.
Third,  corporate  bond  spread  changes  (∆bspreadt)  are 
significant  with  the  expected  positive  sign  in  the  pre-
crisis period, both for AA- and A-rated banks. However, 
in  the  crisis  period,  they  are  insignificant  for  AA-rated 
banks, and significant with the wrong sign for A-rated 
banks. One reason for this rather counter-intuitive result 
appears  to  be  the  joint  increase  in  corporate  bond 
spreads and decrease in CDS spreads of AA- and A-rated 
banks, which took place in early October 2008 following 
the first wave of government interventions. Unreported 
regressions confirm that if we shorten the crisis period to   
16 July 2007 – 5 October 2008, corporate bond spread 
changes have a positive and significant impact on CDS 
spread changes of AA- and A-rated banks.
Fourth,  the  stock  market  return  (Rm,t)  and  the  stock 
market volatility (∆volimpt) are usually insignificant across 
regressions.
Interestingly,  the  R-squared  decomposition  in  Table  5 
shows that, while 70 p.c. of the explained variation in 
CDS  spread  changes  of  A-  and  AA-rated  banks  was 
related to variables proxying for general economic condi-
tions in the pre-crisis period, this proportion fell to 30 p.c. 
for A-rated banks while remaining constant for AA-rated 
banks in the crisis period. This result is consistent with a 
well-established finding in the credit risk literature, namely 
that more highly-rated firms tend to be more sensitive 
to  general  economic  variables  than  lower-rated  firms, 
which are in turn more sensitive to idiosyncratic factors 
(Düllmann and Sosinska, 2007).
Finally,  looking  at  Table  4,  we  see  that  the  adjusted 
R-squared of the regressions estimated over the whole 
sample period is between 25 and 40 p.c., which is similar 
to what other studies on non-financial sector CDS spreads 
have reported. However, we observe that there is a sub-
stantial difference between the adjusted R-squared of the 
pre-crisis and crisis periods. This last result highlights once 
again the strong increase in significance of some of our 
explanatory variables after the start of the crisis.167
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A second finding is that variables suggested by structural 
credit risk models are insignificant, both before and after 
the  start  of  the  crisis,  in  explaining  bank  CDS  spread 
changes.  In  addition,  some  of  the  variables  proxying 
for general economic conditions are significant, but the 
magnitude  of  the  coefficient  estimates  and  their  sign 
changed when the crisis started. These findings suggest 
that financial institutions’ CDS spreads should be exam-
ined together with other market indicators (e.g. Expected 
Default Frequencies, equity prices, etc.).
Finally, CDS market liquidity appears to have become a 
significant factor in explaining European bank CDS spread 
changes when the crisis broke out. This finding suggests 
that the role of CDS market liquidity should be estimated 
explicitly  when  analysing  CDS  spreads.  Most  existing 
studies still treat liquidity as being part of the regression 
residual.
Conclusion
In recent years, market participants and regulators alike 
have begun to look to bank credit default swap spreads as 
indicators of bank credit risk. However, like bond spreads, 
CDS spreads may also reflect other factors, including a 
liquidity premium, systematic credit risk or risk aversion. 
This article presents an empirical analysis of the determi-
nants of euro area bank CDS spread changes before and 
after the start of the financial crisis. In analysing changes 
in CDS premia, we use variables suggested by structural 
credit risk models as well as an indicator of liquidity in the 
CDS  market  and  several  variables  proxying  for  general 
economic conditions.
A  first  result  is  that  the  determinants  of  bank  CDS 
spreads  are  highly  time-varying.  This  finding,  which 
echoes similar results in studies for bond spreads, calls 
for  some  caution  regarding  the  use  of  models  which 
attempt  to  explain  bank  CDS  spreads.  These  models 
must be re-estimated frequently.168
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